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What Would a Policy of ‘Restraint’ Mean for the Warsaw NATO Summit? 
 
Steven Keil (GMFUS) and Tim Oliver (LSE IDEAS) 
 
NATO summits have long been accompanied by a litany of complaints, dire predictions 
and critiques about the future and utility of the Atlantic Alliance. However, numerous 
security concerns in Europe’s neighbourhood have reinvigorated a need for serious 
conversations on Europe’s defence capabilities and NATO. What becomes clear in 
conversations is that NATO’s ability to deliver on these concerns remains in question. 
Given this, heading to Warsaw, five familiar topics hang over the Summit. First, 
continued low levels of European defence spending. Second, European divisions over 
everything from defence cooperation to the future of the European Union. Third, 
European frustration at perceived U.S. indifference and high-handedness. Fourth, the 
spectre of Russian aggression. And fifth, political rumblings regarding the utility of the 
Alliance and its ability to help address non-traditional threats such as the refugee crisis 
and instability along the southern and eastern sides of the Mediterranean.  
 
These problems are heightened by five current issues: continued cuts to European 
defence spending as part of wider policies of austerity; the potential for a British exit 
from the EU (or, should it vote to remain, continued unease and tensions in the 
relationship) or the ongoing refugee crisis to engulf the EU and unravel the European 
project; a U.S. electoral cycle pushing an aggressive, demanding and potentially 
isolationist and nationalist direction; continued Russian activity in Syria, destabilization in 
Ukraine, and the belief Russia is trying to divide Europe; and hopes NATO forces can be 
restructured to serve some end in securing the Mediterranean or tackling ISIS.  
 
Over recent years, several publications have examined changes in the international 
system and the relative U.S. power position. Many of these works have sought to address 
U.S. management of its position relative to other emerging powers through policies of 
decreased engagements or renewed commitments. Given political developments in the 
U.S. and the continued lion’s share of the NATO burden shouldered by the U.S., it 
should come as little surprise that these persistent challenges have reaffirmed the opinion 
of some in the US who feel a policy of withdrawal or restraint would be in the U.S. 
interest. An ideal-type of these opinions, ‘restraint’ is the policy recommended by MIT’s 
Barry Posen. His 2014 book Restraint remains a must-read for anybody – presidential 
candidate, policy wonk, diplomat, European or American – seeking a nuanced, 
unconventional and considered analysis of wider U.S. foreign policy. Posen argues that 
the American foreign policy elite’s dominant view of what he calls ‘liberal hegemony’ has 
ill served U.S. interests. As he sets out in great detail throughout the first part of his 
book, it has been costly in blood and treasure, unnecessary and even counterproductive. 
His proposed alternative of ‘restraint’ would see the US resist the desire – one often 
encouraged by allies – to utilise military power to intervene overseas as often as it has 
done since 1945. Given a global ‘diffusion of power,’1 Posen argues that the U.S. should 
start down a path of ‘phased reduction in political commitments and military 
deployments.’2 
 
                                                 
1 Barry P. Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2014), 174. 
2 Ibid, p 71. 
For NATO, Posen’s approach would mean a fundamental change in the Alliance, 
transforming it from the military to political realm.3 It would also result in the U.S. 
eschewing the commitments of the current North Atlantic Treaty.4 This does not mean 
the US entirely retreats behind the geographical fortifications that still provide its greatest 
source of security: two oceans to west and east, unthreatening neighbours to north and 
south. However, the U.S. would instead pursue restraint as a guiding principle. In 
Posen’s view, when combined with a military force structure suited to implement such a 
strategy, it would allow the U.S. to maintain global access through naval, air and space 
power. But the garrisoning of troops overseas – the most expensive and one of the most 
politically fraught aspects of the U.S. global role – would end. For Posen, a smaller, 
cheaper and more flexible military would benefit the U.S. tax payer; shift strategic 
thinking away from large, costly and counterproductive interventions; and make allies – 
in Europe, Asia and elsewhere – cease free-riding on the U.S. and start looking after their 
own affairs. Posen’s argument would not necessarily mean the end of NATO or of close 
military relationships with allies such as the UK or Japan. But it would see a shift from 
military to political commitments with allies and place security ‘squarely on their 
shoulders’ with the potential for strategic autonomy.5   
 
Would a U.S. grand strategy of ‘restraint’ solve the abovementioned challenges facing 
NATO member countries? First, would a policy of ‘restraint’ reverse low levels of 
European defence spending, something made worse by the wider politics of austerity? It 
is reasonable to believe that the necessity caused by a decreased U.S. presence could 
force spending among European NATO member countries upward. Yet, it is also 
reasonable to believe that threat perception plays a considerable role in driving European 
defence expenditures regardless of U.S. action. From 2014-2015, 18 NATO member 
countries increased their defence spending in real terms. This happened in the middle of 
Russia’s aggression, as well as following a decreased U.S. military footprint in Europe. It 
is important to point out the biggest increases in spending were nearest the aggression in 
the eastern reaches of Europe, particularly Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.6 It is hard to 
create linkages to these changes. It is clear, though, that threats are not uniformly shared 
across the EU. And this complicates Posen’s belief that the EU is a clear foundation for 
building ‘an autonomous defence capability’7 in Europe that would be responsive to 
threats. This perception differs greatly depending on where one is standing. 
 
Continuing the thread, Posen suggests a U.S. emphasis on maritime strategy, one of 
defencing the global commons should be advanced, and therefore, Europeans should 
focus on ground and territorial defence, leaving the U.S. to police the commons. Posen 
argues that this policy of restraint could see U.S. defence spending cut from nearly 4% to 
around 2.5% of GDP. Yet, it remains uncertain what impact this would have on defence 
spending in Europe and Europe’s ability to take on the lion’s share of responsibility in 
Europe and its periphery. In a recent interview with Jeffrey Goldberg in The Atlantic, 
President Obama indicated the failure of Europeans stepping up in post-Qaddafi Libya 
and a moment of U.S. ‘restraint,’ commenting, ‘I had more faith in the Europeans, given 
Libya’s proximity, being invested in the follow-up,’ and then pointed to the UK, 
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commenting that they – in the form of Prime Minister David Cameron – became 
‘distracted by a range of other things.’8 
 
Second, would ‘restraint’ encourage European cooperation as opposed to division? The 
NATO summit takes place only weeks after the UK’s referendum on its continued 
membership of the EU. In the run-up to the referendum, President Obama repeated his 
view that the UK – and Europe and the transatlantic relationship – would be better off if 
Britain votes to remain a member of the EU. Would a message from Obama that the US 
was to pursue a policy of restraint shift the UK debate, warning Britain of an era in 
which Britain and other European countries would need to look to themselves to 
cooperate more to secure their continent? Sadly the state of the debate in the UK points 
the other way. Britain’s debate on leaving the EU is already framed by a British version 
of ‘restraint’. The experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq – from both of which the British 
military did not emerge with a glowing reputation at home or abroad – have left a deep 
scepticism as to the utility of a large interventionist force. The EU’s own problems – the 
Eurozone, Schengen and Russia – have seen the UK act in an almost indifferent way. 
The withdrawal of British troops from permanent bases in Germany means the UK now 
lacks a key military commitment on the mainland of the European continent. If Britain 
votes to leave we may find that it tries to take up a pre-1939 policy of off-shore 
balancing. Britain deludes itself into thinking it pays its way on defence, just about 
keeping defence spending above the 2% NATO guideline thanks to some creative 
accounting.9 Restraint would need to threaten the ‘special relationship’ to have any real 
impact. But even here the impact could be limited. If there is a ‘special relationship’ it is 
focused on the three areas of intelligence, nuclear weapons and special forces. In all three 
the UK and US gain substantially, and a policy of restraint would do little to shift the 
relationship in these three areas, areas which Posen himself notes the US should maintain 
a lead in as part of a grand strategy of restraint. If anything, a policy of US ‘restraint’ 
would be one the UK could seek to align itself with.  
 
But does that mean the rest of Europe – whether in the EU or NATO – will fail to take 
the hint and get their act together? Posen himself is prepared to consider the 
restructuring of NATO or its lapsing, with the EU taking over. A British exit would 
remove one of the main obstacles to European defence cooperation, albeit also taking 
out of the EU one of Europe’s most important military powers. Yet, other divisions 
would remain, such as that over Cyprus that causes tensions with Turkey. And again, 
however, European divisions may be such that ‘restraint’ may if anything see European 
security and defence follow the pattern seen in many areas: renationalisation. Granted, 
the degree of Europeanisation in this area is nothing compared to those achieved in 
economics or the environment, but what little has been achieved could be reversed. That 
EU policies have been under intense pressure has led some to speculate about the future 
unity of the EU as a whole. Could we be witnessing the disintegration of the European 
project? Posen argues that Europe is ‘inherently stable,’10 but the real concern for 
renationalisation of Europe is palpable and calls into question this assumption. U.S. 
Secretary of State John Kerry commented on the challenges facing Europe and the 
potential disintegration of the European project, stating his concern it could lead to 
“nationalism and fascism and other things breaking out. Of course we have an interest in 
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this, a huge interest in this.”11 Given this, would a Brexit, another crisis in the Eurozone 
or a major terrorist attack break the Union that currently stands as Europe’s 
predominant organisation for economics, politics and non-traditional security? With the 
UK potentially leaving and a U.S. withdrawal vis-à-vis ‘restraint’ a vacuum for leadership 
in collective European security could easily appear. As Posen rightly points out in the 
early parts of his book, ‘coalitions are always subject to collective action problems’ and 
democracies struggle ‘to cooperate in security matters without a powerful leader.’12 
Without the UK and U.S. the short-list of security leadership in Europe shrinks 
considerably, as does its capacity to coalesce a unified security policy. 
 
Third, Europe has a long history of being riled at U.S. indifference and high-handedness. 
That was kept in check during the Cold War by the threat of the USSR. While the 
dangers facing Europe today are not to be dismissed, they no longer clearly define the 
importance and necessity of the Atlantic Alliance. The NSA spying activities have left 
some in Europe wondering if the U.S. itself is not a threat in some way. Suspicions of an 
underlying hostility toward Europe (and, to be fair, the rest of the world) are played out 
daily on European TV screens and laptops. Posen’s strategy of restraint may not alleviate 
this reality, but could potentially enforce it and, in Europe, embolden those with anti-
American sentiments. The open frustration voiced time and time again by senior U.S. 
officials sounds like a scolding rather than encouraging Europeans to take on a larger 
share of their burden. At the top of this list is then-U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates’ 
comments that NATO may face ‘a dim if not dismal future’ if Europeans fail to do more 
in the Alliance.13 And more recently, President Obama openly aired his frustration at 
‘free riders’ (read Posen’s cheap-riding), characterizing the continued lack of defence 
spending as ‘aggravating.’14 Add to this that Europeans watch a presidential election in 
which an ugly nationalism in U.S. politics has been on display led by presidential 
candidate Donald Trump. Any policy of ‘restraint’ forwarded by Trump would likely be 
delivered in such a blunt, nationalist and antagonistic way that it would surely undermine 
rather than change the transatlantic relationship in a positive way. On the campaign trail, 
Trump has already commented that NATO countries are ‘ripping off the United States’ 
and ‘either they have to pay up for past deficiencies or they have to get out. And if it 
breaks up NATO, it breaks up NATO.’15 One may assume this is not the policy of 
‘restraint’ that Posen has in mind, in rhetoric, but it is somewhat the argument in 
practice. Any policy of greater ‘restraint’ in Europe will easily be perceived as added 
indifference and abandonment by the U.S. in regional European affairs. Recognizing the 
numerous achievements made by U.S. investment in Europe will be crucial, but given the 
security climate in Europe, Posen’s policy of restraint would not likely relieve the feelings 
of indifference, while messaging would be critical in manging the perceptions of U.S. 
high-handedness.    
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Fourth, the spectre of Russian aggression ahead of the NATO summit remains 
problematic for Posen’s policy of U.S. ‘restraint.’ Even some of the proponents of 
restraint in the American foreign policy establishment are signalling the need to do more 
to effectively deter Russian antagonisms. And the conclusions of many in the Alliance 
are to add to NATO capabilities in Europe, with the need for Europeans to shoulder 
more of the burden. Subsequent disagreements are more about location and volume, not 
if something needs to be done. Arguing that the decreased engagement of the U.S. would 
not be a threat to European security, Posen suggests that ‘if Europeans large and small 
hang together, Russia cannot do much.’16 Yet, continued Russian activity in Syria and the 
belief Russia is trying to divide Europe add complexity to this assumption. Moreover, 
given the aforementioned challenges facing the EU and a policy of restraint for the U.S. 
in NATO, there may be significant doubt regarding the legitimacy of transatlantic and 
European unity and policies. Russia has redrawn the European map with force and the 
response by many Europeans has been largely one of indifference, and in some cases, 
support. Moreover, given the varying threat perceptions across Euroatlantic partners, the 
NATO consensus requirement and an active U.S. in the Alliance may prevent impulsive 
responses to Russia’s aggressions by Allies. As Stephen Brooks, John Ikenberry and 
William Wohlforth argued in 2013, U.S. security commitments can ‘dissuade U.S. 
partners from trying to solve security problems on their own in ways that would ended 
up threatening other states.’17 In this case, it could be that U.S. engagement in NATO 
may have only deterred additional violence from Russia, but also tempered the response 
across the Allies (perhaps even including the U.S.).  
 
Russia should not be seen as a military challenge alone. Its economic and demographic 
situation means it might not be the power it likes to believe it is, and certainly not one 
comparable to the likes of China. But it has served as a model for the relative staying-
power of a system built on nationalism, authoritarianism and a commitment to 
‘sovereignty’ in the face of the challenges presented by globalisation. While not a ‘great 
power,’ Russia has effected change on its neighbours’ borders through force on more 
than one occasion in the last decade. Moreover, Moscow has shown an ability to use a 
spectrum of disruption against Europe and the transatlantic partnership through 
unconventional methods capped by informational warfare. Posen accepts that 
maintaining a balance of power in Eurasia should be a key aim for the US. It, along with 
managing nuclear proliferation and suppressing international terrorist organisations that 
target the U.S., are the most important security challenges he identifies. Yet, he views 
Russia as incapable of hegemony, itself a declining and flawed power. But does he 
overlook the authoritarian model in Moscow? Given the low-intensity and 
unconventional nature of Moscow’s threats, coupled with more overt aggressions, it is 
worth evaluating the appropriate scope for a large military budget that can drain 
resources from a powerful and successful U.S. economy, which underpins its democratic 
society and is one of the strongest rebuttals against authoritarian models.  
 
Fifth, doubts regarding the ultimate direction of the alliance remain and wider 
discontents in transatlantic relations could mean it would fail to achieve any clearly 
defined mission, if one could be agreed. For Posen, his thesis would gladly answer this 
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question by saying that NATO today has outlived its initial purpose.18 Posen argues that 
NATO’s role to ensure stability at the end of the Cold War has passed and now the 
policy is wrong.19 Yet, looking at Europe today, as this article has done, stability doesn’t 
seem to be the theme of the day. Security concerns abound. Yet, whether NATO is the 
proper institution to address these challenges remains worth asking and so is whether the 
U.S. should continue to foot-the-bill or pursue a course of greater ‘restraint.’ This is 
particularly true in addressing the challenges to Europe’s south. Hopes remain that 
NATO forces can be restructured to serve some end in securing the Mediterranean 
border for Europe (namely the sea). A NATO naval mission may launch off the coast of 
Libya to control migrant flows, but there seems to be a clear lack of will or purpose for 
NATO to directly address the ongoing violence across the Middle East and North 
Africa. In fact, conversations about Libya reconstruction efforts have been taken up by 
Italy without the involvement of NATO. Following the Paris terrorist attacks, rather 
than pursuing NATO Article V, the French government sought an obscure EU treaty 
provision for European solidarity. And when the U.S. has contemplated military 
intervention, it has not often looked to NATO (anti-ISIL coalition).  
 
A more deliberate pursuit of ‘restraint’ would clearly set out a new mission for U.S. 
engagement in Europe and its role in NATO. Posen argues for a policy of  ‘restraint’ that 
rewrites Article V, and results in a Euroatlantic partnership that operates in consultations 
and agreed upon concerted actions, when necessary, but never with obligation. Clearly, 
even for any restructuring of NATO, strong U.S. leadership will still be needed: one that 
leads while moderating its ambitions and the ambitions of the Alliance. However, it is 
unclear that such actions would lead to greater European security or strengthen the 
transatlantic partnership. Many of the questions heading in to the Warsaw Summit would 
likely remain for some time. Throughout his book, Posen clarifies that he is not a fan of 
radical, fast-paced change, admitting that a slow transition will be necessary, but whether 
the speed of the transition will enable or encourage Europe to take up greater defence 
measures is hard to predict in such a volatile political climate. Rather, it could just expose 
greater divisions and deficiencies among Euroatlantic partners. It would be difficult for 
any Washington drawdown be seen as anything other than abandonment by Allies in the 
current context.   
 
Posen is under no illusions as to the challenges faced in seeing his idea implemented. 
And he signals that the fight to convince the foreign policy elite in the U.S. is only half 
the battle. The fight to convince European allies to play along with this new policy would 
be another part, to say nothing of allies in Asia and the Middle East. And he 
acknowledges many strong counter arguments to what he has proposed in his book. The 
changes that have occurred over the past few years in the transatlantic relationship have 
seemed to only complicate the potential for advancing a policy of ‘restraint’ like the one 
proposed by Posen. Yet, while the ideal-type of Posen’s policy may be difficult to 
implement, the concerns and ideas behind it are certainly worth consideration by 
Washington’s policymakers. Limited budgets and competing security priorities simply 
mean that the U.S. cannot be everything to everyone or fix every problem across the 
globe. In many cases, its attempts to do so may only further complicate the US position 
and exacerbate tensions among Allies. 
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However, in advance of the NATO Summit and contrary to the belief of many, 
European partners have been doing much more in their regional security affairs. But 
considerably more remains to be done. Consequently, many of these familiar topics 
overhanging the upcoming Warsaw Summit will continue to be part of European 
security conversations despite or in spite of U.S. policies for quite some time. In some 
cases, the policy of ‘restraint’ as proposed by Posen could potentially alleviate some 
pressures facing NATO. However, as discussed, they could also exacerbate the security 
situation of European partners who have little capacity to fully take on the wide-range of 
security concerns facing the continent. This lack of an effective deterrent and balance of 
power on the Eurasian landmass will invite Posen’s feared hegemon, and could easily 
recommit the U.S. to more costly endeavours away from its home shores. If a policy of 
‘restraint’ would be a long-term goal for U.S. foreign policy makers, it must be sensitive 
to the challenges presently facing its Euroatlantic partners and today’s geopolitical 
realities. 
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